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Abstract
This paper presents a model of occupational choice in a labor market characterized by moral hazard.
The model demonstrates that in such a labor market, workers’ occupational choices are determined by not
only their comparative advantage but also their effort decisions in each occupation. The estimation re-
sults, based on data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, suggest that workers’ self-selection
into white collar and blue collar occupations leads to higher wages and lower dismissal rates in both oc-
cupations. Furthermore, analysis results reveal that these effects of self-selection diminish as the labor
market becomes increasingly characterized by moral hazard.
∗I am grateful to Robert Moffitt and Christopher Flinn for their invaluable comments and guidance. I have also benefited from
helpful discussions with Matthew Shum and I˙nsan Tunalı, and from comments made by seminar participants at the Johns Hopkins
University, New York University, SUNY Stony Brook and Koç University.
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1 Introduction
A common finding among studies of involuntary job loss is that blue collar workers experience substantially
higher dismissal rates than white collar workers. Displaced Worker Surveys data show that production
workers consistently had higher involuntary job loss rates than any other occupational category between
1981 and 1995. The job loss rate for craft workers, operatives and laborers in the 1993-1995 period was
13.5 percent, while the job loss rate for professionals was 7.8 percent and 5.9 percent for managers (Farber,
1997). Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth also indicate that blue collar workers are on
average twice as likely to be dismissed over the first 11 years of their job tenure as white collar workers
(Figure 1).
In this paper, I investigate the extent to which self-selection of workers into occupations in the presence
of moral hazard can generate the occupational differences in dismissal rates that are observed in the data. I
present a two-sector model of self-selection, in which each sector is characterized by imperfect monitoring
on the part of firms and incentives to shirk on the part of workers. Dismissals in this model occur when
workers are caught to be shirking during the firm’s random monitoring of workers. Workers, endowed
with two-dimensional ability bundles, choose occupations based on their comparative advantage, wages
and monitoring intensity in each occupation. The pattern of self-selection causes the distribution of worker
abilities in an occupation to differ from the population distribution. As a result, occupational self-selection
leads to systematic differences in average productivity, shirking propensity and consequently dismissal rates
across occupations.
The model of occupational choice presented in this paper draws key elements from Roy’s model of
self-selection (1951). Roy’s model rests on the intuition that tasks in different occupations require dif-
ferent types of skills. Therefore, when making occupational choices, workers consider their relative skill
levels, their comparative advantages, in different occupations. The model has been applied to explain var-
ious labor market issues, including sectoral choice and wage distribution (Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985),
wage inequality (Gould, 2002), and patterns of schooling, employment and occupational choice (Keane
and Wolpin, 1997). However, studies investigating the impact of occupational self-selection on observed
patterns of labor turnover are few.
The main papers that model the relationship between occupational choice and turnover behavior are
those by Miller (1984), McCall (1990) and Neal (1999). Although these studies focus on and explain differ-
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ent aspects of labor mobility, all three formulate the turnover behavior within a search-matching framework.
More recently, Moscarini has shown the implications of comparative advantage in a frictional search model
(2001). As in any model based on the job search-matching tradition, in these studies, turnover is driven by
the uncertainty regarding the match productivity; therefore, quits and dismissals are behaviorally equivalent.
The main contribution of this paper is to analyze the implications of occupational sorting on dismissal
rates across occupations when dismissals are caused by poor performance or malfeasance. This study shows
that when the labor market is characterized by moral hazard, selection into occupations is driven not only
by workers’ comparative advantage but also by the underlying differences in their effort decisions in each
occupation. While comparative advantage plays an important role in the occupational choice decisions of
workers who do not shirk, workers who shirk on the job take into consideration the monitoring intensities
in the two occupations.
The sources of occupational self-selection in this model can be traced back to the dual roles played by the
occupation-specific worker abilities, which determine both disutility of effort and propensity to shirk in this
model. First, conditional on not shirking, a worker’s occupation-specific ability determines the disutility that
the worker receives from exerting effort in a given occupation. Workers with high ability in an occupation
complete the required tasks with minimal effort, thus they receive relatively low disutility from working in
that occupation. On the other hand, low-ability workers have to exert relatively more effort to complete the
tasks and thus receive higher disutility from working in a given occupation. Second, the occupation-specific
worker ability affects the probability that a worker shirks in a given occupation. High-ability workers tend to
have a lower propensity to shirk because the disutility that they receive from exerting effort and completing
the tasks in an occupation is relatively low. In contrast, workers with low ability are more likely to shirk
since they have a greater incentive to avoid the large disutility that would result if they exert effort and
complete the required tasks.
Because of its dual role as determinant of disutility of effort and as a factor in propensity to shirk, work-
ers’ skill endowments affect their selection into occupations in two distinct ways. First, among non-shirkers,
occupational choice is determined to a large extent by the relative disutility associated with employment in
the two occupations, and thus on the worker’s relative abilities in the two occupations. What derives the sort-
ing in this case, is workers’ comparative advantage; therefore, the intuition behind this type of self-selection
is similar to that depicted in other comparative advantage self-selection models1. Second, a worker’s effort
1See Sattinger (1993) for a discussion of comparative advantage and its role in occupational choice.
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decision plays an important role in his occupational choice decision because it determines which factors
are taken into account by the worker in his occupational decision. For instance, for a worker who exerts
effort in both occupations, his relative disutility of effort in the two occupations plays an important role in
his occupational decision. In contrast, disutility of effort does not enter a shirker’s decision-making process
since he exerts no effort and thus receives no disutility from it. Instead, a shirker considers how closely he
will be monitored in each occupation in order to assess his probability of dismissal. Therefore, workers’
occupational sorting depends in part on the sequence of work/shirk decisions that they will make in the two
occupations and consequently on their relative abilities in these occupations. Through its impact on the
worker’s effort decisions, the worker’s skill bundle determines the relative importance of disutility of effort,
firm’s monitoring intensity and wages in worker’s occupational decision.
I extend a shirking model developed by Flinn to describe the moral hazard problem and the resulting
dismissals in the two sectors of the economy (1997). The model shares key components with the Shapiro-
Stiglitz model and many of its extensions (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). However, it also has two properties
that are not simultaneously present in most standard Shapiro-Stiglitz type shirking models. First, the model
generates an equilibrium in which shirking exists. This property is crucial in studying the impact of shirking
propensity on workers’ self-selection pattern because it generates variation in shirking probability among
workers2. Second, the shirking model used in this paper is a dynamic model; therefore, it allows one to
compare the pattern of wages, dismissal rates and average productivity in each occupation over time. By
nesting a shirking model in a general self-selection framework, the model presented in this paper allows one
to study the relationship between a worker’s occupational decision and his effort decision. More specifically,
it allows one to determine the relative importance of comparative advantage and information problems in
determining workers’ selection of occupations.
I estimate the structural parameters of the model using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth. The estimation results suggest that self-selection of workers increases expected worker productivity
in both blue collar and white collar occupations as average worker ability in each occupation is estimated to
be above the population mean. Consequently, workers’ selection into occupations leads to higher wages and
lower dismissal rates in both occupations compared to an economy in which workers are randomly assigned
to each occupation. The monitoring rate in the white collar occupation is estimated to be higher than the
2Albrecht and Vroman (1998) extend the Shapiro-Stiglitz model by adding worker heterogeneity and consequently generate an
equilibrium in which some workers shirk. However, their model does not include a dynamic process.
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monitoring rate in the blue collar occupation, suggesting that white collar workers are monitored more
closely than blue collar workers. Findings also indicate that the difference between the rates of dismissal for
cause between the two occupations is driven by the higher expected productivity in the white collar sector.
Higher wages and higher monitoring rate in the white collar occupation seem to provide stronger incentives
to exert effort than those in the blue collar occupation, causing the white collar workforce to have a smaller
proportion of shirkers than the blue collar workforce.
In addition, the estimation results suggest that there is only a small degree of positive selection into the
white collar occupation as workers with high ability in the white collar occupation have a slightly higher
probability of choosing that occupation. There is evidence of a more substantial degree of selection into the
blue collar occupation although the selection is mixed as workers at both ends of the ability distribution tend
to choose the white collar occupation. The analysis results also show that if the occupational sorting took
place in a labor market without a moral hazard problem, workers in both occupations would predominantly
come from the higher ability end of the population distribution. A comparison of the post-selection marginal
distributions that result under moral hazard with those that come about in the no moral hazard case suggests
that the existence of moral hazard mitigates the degree of positive selection into both occupations. This
difference can be explained by the behavior of low ability workers who tend to be the potential shirkers
when there is moral hazard in the labor market. When compared to the case without moral hazard, workers
in the moral hazard case have a higher probability of choosing an occupation in which they have low ability
since they now have the option of shirking and avoiding the disutility of effort.
Finally, I present results of comparative statics exercises, which investigate the effects of a higher moni-
toring rate and a higher output price on labor market outcomes. Results reveal that a higher monitoring rate
in the blue collar occupation leads to higher wages and lower dismissal rates in the blue collar occupation
and lower wages and higher dismissal rates in the white collar occupation. While an increase in the blue
collar monitoring rate decreases the propensity to shirk in the blue collar occupation, it makes the white
collar occupation relatively more attractive to those workers, who have low ability and are potential shirk-
ers in both occupations. On the other hand, a higher white collar output price leads to higher wages and
lower dismissal rates in both occupations. These findings illustrate how a change in the parameters of a
given occupation may have positive or adverse effects on the labor market outcomes in the other occupation
depending on its impact on the workers’ selection pattern.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section discusses alternative approaches to modeling dis-
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missals in the literature, Section 3 presents the model and results of representative simulations, Section
4 describes the estimation methodology, and Section 5 discusses identification issues. Sections 6 and 7
present the description of the dataset and the discussion of the results, respectively, and Section 8 includes
concluding remarks.
2 Alternative Approaches to Occupational Differences in Dismissal Rates
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data indicate that the rate of dismissals differs substantially between
white collar and blue collar occupations. Figure 1 shows involuntary separation rates by occupation against
the number of years in occupation3. These statistics indicate that blue collar workers are on average more
than twice as likely to experience a firm-initiated separation as white collar workers during the first 11 years
in occupation.
Models of labor turnover provide different explanations for the variation in dismissal rates across occu-
pations, based on differing interpretations of dismissals. The job matching model, which is frequently used
to explain labor turnover behavior, argues that there exists uncertainty regarding the value of a worker-firm
match (Jovanovic, 1979). Both the worker and the firm learn about the match value through worker’s out-
put over his tenure, and matches whose values are revealed to be low end in worker-firm separations. The
life-cycle implication of this model is that young workers are more likely to change jobs since typically
they have not had enough time in the labor market to find a good match (Topel and Ward, 1992). As a
result, occupations that are predominantly occupied by young workers will exhibit high rates of worker-firm
separations. Miller extends the job matching model to incorporate differences in the level of matching
uncertainty between occupations (1984). According to his model, occupations with higher levels of uncer-
tainty regarding the match value exhibit higher turnover rates as workers in these occupations learn about
their match value fairly quickly and move on to other jobs in case of bad matches.
Matching-search models can also be used in conjunction with the human capital theory to explain the
observed differences in dismissal rates between occupations. According to the human capital model, job-
specific human capital accumulation increases the value of the worker-firm match relative to the outside
alternatives. Therefore, occupations with more opportunities for on-the-job training or a higher rate of
learning-by-doing exhibit lower rates of separations.
3Involuntary separations are those that are involuntary to the worker and include both firings and lay-offs.
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Although the matching-search framework is successful in explaining several regularities observed in la-
bor turnover behavior, it implies that worker-initiated and firm-initiated separations are behaviorally equiv-
alent. Empirical evidence suggests that there may be underlying differences between the two types of sep-
arations. For example, previous research has shown that workers who experience an involuntary separation
earn lower wages on their next job following the separation than workers who report a voluntary from their
previous jobs (Bartel and Borjas, 1981; Gibbons and Katz, 1991).
Another approach to explaining dismissals is to treat them as an outcome of labor demand fluctuations,
which are in turn caused by shocks to preferences or technology. To the extent that different sectors of
the economy experience different labor demand fluctuations and that the prevalence of occupational groups
varies across sectors, involuntary separations due to firms’ operating decisions will cause dismissal rates to
differ between occupations. Even when all sectors of the economy are equally affected by fluctuations in
labor demand, different occupations may still experience higher rates of dismissals due to the heterogeneity
in the population. For instance, if dismissal rates depend on certain socioeconomic characteristics, then the
socioeconomic make-up of the workforce in an occupation would determine the rate of dismissals in that
occupation. Idiosyncratic shifts in labor demand, however, fail to explain certain features of the dismissal
data. The finding that most turnover takes place within sectors instead of between sectors and the result
that the conditional probability of being dismissed decreases over one’s tenure in the job or in the occupa-
tion cannot be explained solely by this framework. Furthermore, Jovanovic and Moffitt present empirical
evidence that demand shifts do not explain the majority of the labor turnover in the labor market (1990).
This paper presents a third approach to explaining the dismissal rate differences between occupations.
According to this approach, involuntary separations are dependent on workers’ effort decisions. Firms dis-
miss workers due to poor performance on the job or malfeasance. In this case, differences in dismissal rates
across occupations arise when (1) workers in different occupations display intrinsically different perfor-
mance and effort levels and/or (2) the intensity with which workers are monitored varies across occupations.
If we abstract from firms’ monitoring rate decisions, then the pressing question is why workers exhibit
different effort levels and consequently different levels of productivity across occupations.
In this paper, I demonstrate that workers’ self-selection into occupations can lead to differences in av-
erage worker productivity between occupations, which in turn bring about differences in dismissal rates.
Using a structural model of occupational choice and moral hazard in the labor market, I investigate the
extent to which occupational self-selection explains why white collar workers have a lower probability of
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dismissal than blue collar workers. I also test whether the model’s implications for the wage profiles of
workers in different occupations are consistent with the patterns observed in the data.
The structural model presented in this paper has advantages over more reduced form approaches. The
primary advantage is that it allows one to examine the direct and indirect roles played by the model’s
structural parameters in bringing about equilibrium wages, average worker productivity and dismissals.
Furthermore, through comparative static exercises, one can study how the existence of moral hazard affects
workers’ selection into occupations and also assess the implications of changes to the structural parameters,
such as the monitoring rate and the output price. The identification of these parameters requires assumptions
that are detailed later in the paper.
Before discussing the specifics of the model, one should note its focus and its boundaries. First, the
model presented here explains dismissals that are due to workers’ lack of effort. Therefore, the model ab-
stracts from other factors that influence dismissals, such as poor worker-firm matches and exogenous shocks
to labor demand. Second, this model involves a single source of wage growth, which is the systematic dis-
missal of unproductive workers from the firm. Demiralp (2007) incorporates other sources of wage growth,
particularly the human capital accumulation. By focusing primarily on the implications of occupational
self-selection and moral hazard, this paper is aimed to investigate the extent to which the equilibrium wage
and dismissal dynamics that are generated by occupational selection with moral hazard are consistent with
the patterns observed in the data.
3 The Model
3.1 The Set-up
The labor market consists of a primary and a secondary sector, both of which are made up of perfectly
competitive firms. The primary sector is characterized by the moral hazard problem. This problem stems
from the assumption that primary sector firms cannot perfectly observe their workers’ effort levels, possibly
due to the lack of an employee-specific output measure, which is necessary for observing effort through
output. The utility flow to a worker in each period is given by wt− et, where wt is the wage that he receives
and et is the amount of effort that he exerts in period t. Due to the disutility of effort, workers have an
incentive to shirk. I assume that firms randomly monitor their workers in an attempt to detect shirking in
their workforce. The punishment for shirking is dismissal from the firm.
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The primary sector, in turn, consists of two subsectors, denoted by j and k where j, k = 1, 2 and j 6= k.
Firms in primary sector j have monitoring rate πj ,and output price ρj , both of which are taken as exogenous.
The monitoring rate is a measure of the intensity with which firms provide supervision of employees. It
means that a worker in firm j faces a constant probability, πj , of being monitored by the firm. Differences in
monitoring rates reflect differences in monitoring technologies and monitoring costs across firms. Workers
who are detected to be shirking and are therefore dismissed, find jobs in the secondary sector of the labor
market.
In the secondary sector, firms perfectly observe effort via employee-specific output; therefore, there is no
moral hazard. Since firms are competitive, the secondary sector wage equals the output price. Furthermore,
the amount of effort needed to produce one unit of output in this sector equals the output price, so the utility
flow for each worker is zero. The secondary sector consists of two types of firms. Workers who are dismissed
from primary sector firm j find employment in the secondary sector firm j and earn wage given by wsj . The
secondary sector is an absorbing state; workers in this sector cannot be rehired in the primary sector4. As I
will show below, workers in the primary sector receive a positive utility flow in each period; thus, workers
voluntarily start their labor market careers in the primary sector.
The two types of primary sector firms, firm j and firm k, require their workers to perform a unique task.
Each worker is endowed with two productive inefficiency indices, ξj and ξk, which determine the amount
of effort needed to complete the firm-specific task in firms j and k, respectively. Workers are heterogeneous
with respect to their productive inefficiency indices. In particular, ξj and ξk are distributed according to a
bivariate population distribution, denoted by the cdfH(ξj , ξk), and the corresponding marginal distributions
are given byHj(ξj) andHk(ξk). The marginal distribution of log ξj has mean, µj , and standard deviation,
αj , and the covariance of log ξj and log ξk is αjk. Furthermore, workers know their own endowments of
productive inefficiency indices in the beginning of the labor market careers.
The production function for a worker of type ξj in the primary sector firm j in period t is
yj(et; ξj) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 iff et ≥ ξj
0 otherwise
⎫
⎪⎬
⎪⎭
(1)
4This condition has two parts. First, workers who are detected and dismissed in primary sector firm j cannot be rehired by firm
j. This condition is an outcome and not an assumption of the model. This result is explained in Flinn (1997). I add the assumption
that workers who are dismissed in primary sector firm 1 cannot be hired by primary sector 2. Combined with the above-mentioned
result, this assumption yields that secondary sector is an absorbing state.
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where et is the amount of effort exerted in period t. Therefore, a worker’s productive inefficiency index, ξj ,
can be interpreted as the minimum amount of effort that the worker has to exert in order to produce one unit
of output. Since workers receive disutility from putting forth effort, they either exert the minimum effort
possible to produce output (i.e. ξj) or they exert no effort at all and shirk5. Finally, workers have infinite
horizon, and they discount the future by a factor, β.
The structure of the model carries several assumptions. First, the monitoring rate is exogenous. There-
fore, firms are assumed to have already made decisions on monitoring rates before workers choose their
occupations, and they cannot change their monitoring decisions in the duration covered by this model6.
Second, workers are assumed to perfectly observe their productive inefficiency indices in each firm, elimi-
nating the case in which workers learn about their productive inefficiencies. Finally, I assume that workers
who are dismissed from firm primary sector firm j cannot be hired by primary sector firm k. Due to this
assumption, the model abstracts from the inter-occupational mobility of workers after dismissal.
The following subsections discuss the worker’s decision, the primary sector firm’s decision, and the
equilibrium of the model, respectively. In subsection 3.5, I discuss in more detail the implications of the
model regarding self-selection properties and present results of representative simulations.
3.2 Worker’s Decision
Workers in this model make two types of decisions: 1) at the beginning of their labor market careers, they
decide for which primary sector firm to work, 2) in each period of their employment in the primary sector,
they decide whether to work or shirk. I first explain the work/shirk decision of the worker conditional on his
employment in firm j. Then, I discuss worker’s decision regarding the type of primary sector firm for which
to work.
Consider worker i in firm j. As explained above, a worker will either choose to exert effort in the amount
of his productive inefficiency index, ξij , or no effort. Therefore, his work/shirk decision in each period is
based on the following maximization problem. The value of employment in firm j in period t by worker i
is
Vijt(ξij) = max
©
wjt − ξij + βVij,t+1(ξij);wjt + β(1− πj)Vij,t+1(ξij)
ª
(2)
5The production function can be equivalently interpreted as stochastic in the following way:
yj(et; ξj) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 with probability 1 if et ≥ ξj
1 with probability 1− πj if et < ξj
0 with probability πj if et < ξj
⎫
⎬
⎭
6The monitoring rate could be endogenous if firms adjust their monitoring rates in response to workers’ productivity.
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where the first argument is the value of working, and the second argument is the value of shirking. This
function reflects the assumption that worker’s utility flow in the secondary sector is zero.
If we assume that the wage sequence is monotonically increasing over time, a worker of type ξij will
work if ξij ≤ ξjt (3)
shirk otherwise
where the threshold level of productive inefficiency in firm j in period t, ξjt, equals
ξjt =
βπj(1− β)
1− β + βπj
Ã ∞X
s=t+1
βs−t+1wjs
!
Furthermore, in the beginning of his labor market history, the worker makes a one-time decision about
which firm to work for based on his likelihood of dismissal and the wages offered by different firms. Given
Equation 3, Equation 2 can be expressed as
Vijt = I(ξij < ξjt) · (wjt − ξij + βVi,j,t+1) + I(ξij ≥ ξjt) · (wjt + β(1− πj)Vi,j,t+1) (4)
Worker i chooses the firm that maximizes his value of employment in the beginning of period 1, (Vijt=1).
Therefore, worker i chooses firm j iff Vi,j,t=1 > Vi,k,t=1. This condition can equally be expressed in terms
of the worker’s productive inefficiency as follows: Worker chooses firm j iff
ξi,j < ξ
∗
j (ξik; {wj}∞t=1, {wk}∞t=1, πj , πk) (5)
ξ∗j is a function of worker’s productive inefficiency in firm k, ξik, therefore, the marginal distribution of ξj
in period 1 among workers who choose firm j is given by
fj,t=1(ξj) =
∞Z
0
hj(ξj)
Hj(ξ∗(ξk))
dHk(ξk) (6)
The marginal distribution of ξj in firm j changes over time in a systematic way as a constant proportion
of shirking workers are detected and dismissed in each period. In particular, if we consider a cohort of
workers who start to work in firm j at the same time, the marginal distribution of workers remaining in the
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cohort changes over time with the mass point of the distribution moving toward lower levels of productive
inefficiency. The cdf of worker types remaining in the cohort at the end of period t in firm j can be expressed
in terms of the cdf of worker types in firm j in period one. When the sequence of the ξjt is increasing, the
relationship between Fjt(ξjt) and Fj,t=1(ξj) is given by the following equation (Flinn, 1997).
Fjt(ξjt) = 1−
¡
1− Fj,t=1(ξjt)
¢
Ajt
³©
ξjs
ªt−1
s=1
´
where
Ajt
³©
ξjs
ªt−1
s=1
´
=
½
1 +
πj
(1− πj)t−1
Fj,t=1(ξj,t=1) + · · ·+
πj
1− πj
Fj,t=1(ξj,t−1)
¾−1
3.3 Firm’s Decision
In this subsection, I will continue to consider the labor market experiences of a cohort of workers, who enter
the firm at the same time. The firm cannot observe the productive inefficiency index of each worker in the
cohort, so it cannot observe whether each worker is working or shirking. However, the firm observes the
marginal distribution of productive inefficiencies within the cohort, fjt(ξj), the threshold level of productive
inefficiency in each period, ξjt, and thus the expected productivity in a cohort, given by Fjt(ξjt).
Due to the zero profit condition, the firm pays cohort members the value of the expected productivity in
the cohort. Therefore, the wage that firm j offers to the members of a cohort in period t of their employment
is given by Equation 77.
wjt = ρjFjt(ξjt) (7)
As a result, everyone in the cohort earns the same wage although they make different effort decisions based
on their productive inefficiency indices.
7The wage contracts described in this paper are individual wage contracts. Wage contracts that depend on group output are not
considered.
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3.4 Equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium wage sequence is defined as the fixed point of the following operator:
T ({wjt}) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρjFj,t=1(ξj,t=1)
ρjFj,t=2(ξj,t=2)
...
ρjFj,t=τ (ξj,t=τ )
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(8)
where ξjt is given by Equation 3. The fixed point of T ({wjt}) gives the equilibrium wage sequence in firm
j conditional on Fj,t=1, which is the post-selection marginal distribution of ξj in firm j. Let νj and ωj be
the parameters that characterize Fj,t=1. The parameters of Fj,t=1 and Fk,t=1, are in turn fixed points of the
operator given in Equation 9, which completes the characterization of the equilibrium in this model.
⎡
⎢⎣
Fj,t=1(νj , ωj)
Fk,t=1(νk, ωk)
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∞Z
0
hj(ξj)
Hj(ξ∗(w1(Fj,t=1(νj ,ωj)),w2(Fk,t=1(νk,ωk))))
dHk(ξk)
∞Z
0
hk(ξk)
Hk(ξ∗(w1(Fj,t=1(νj ,ωj)),w2(Fk,t=1(νk,ωk))))
dHj(ξj)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(9)
Every iteration in solving the fixed point problem in Equation 8 involves the computation of the equilibrium
wage sequence; therefore, the algorithm to compute the fixed points of T ({wjt}) is nested within the fixed
point algorithm to compute the parameters of Fj,t=1(ξj) and Fk,t=1(ξk).
This equilibrium has several important features. First, the equilibrium wage sequence in firm j depends
not only on the output price, worker distribution and monitoring rate in firm j, but also on the wages and
parameters in firm k. Intuitively, this result captures the fact that when workers select firm types, they take
into account the wages and monitoring rates in both types of firms. Therefore, the marginal distribution of
workers in a given firm depends on the wages and monitoring rates observed in the entire primary sector.
The second feature of this equilibrium is that the equilibrium wage sequence is monotonically increasing
over time due to the systematic dismissal of relatively inefficient workers. In each period, a proportion
of relatively inefficient workers are dismissed. Therefore, the remaining cohort is made up of a lower
proportion of relatively inefficient workers. As the expected productive inefficiency in the cohort falls, the
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expected worker productivity and wages rise. Furthermore, a worker’s effort decision is not constant over
time. With wages monotonically increasing over time, different workers stop shirking at different times
depending on their productive inefficiency index with high productivity workers (low productive inefficiency
workers) deciding to put forth effort earlier than others.
Finally, the system in Equation 8 is not recursive. Although ξjt depends only on the wage sequence
starting in period t + 1, Fjt depends on the entire wage sequence, {wjt}∞t=1. The computation of the
equilibrium wage sequences is discussed in the appendix.
3.5 Simulations
As shown in the previous section, one of the key determinants of the pattern of selection into occupations
is the variance-covariance structure of the population distribution of worker types. In this section, I present
results of representative simulations, demonstrating how the correlation between ξj and ξk in the population
affects the direction of self-selection in the labor market. In particular, I compare the outcome when the two
random variables have a high positive correlation to the case when they are negatively correlated.
I assume that the population distribution of worker types is characterized by a bivariate lognormal distri-
bution. ξ1 and ξ2 denote the workers’ productive inefficiencies in firms 1 and 2, respectively. The population
marginal distribution of log ξ1 has a mean and variance of 2 and 1.8, and the corresponding parameters for
the population marginal distribution of log ξ2 are 1.2 and 0.8, respectively. The full set of parameters used
in the simulation are given in Table 1.
Figures 2 and 3 present the population marginal distributions of log ξ1 and log ξ2 as well as the post-
selection marginal distributions in each firm when log ξ1 and log ξ2 have a correlation coefficient of 0.83.
These results show that the pdf of log ξ1 among people who choose firm 1 lies above the lower tail of the
population distribution and below the upper tail of the population distribution, indicating a positive selection
into firm 1. Therefore, workers with lower productive inefficiency indices that are relevant in firm 1 (i.e.
higher levels of the type of ability used in firm 1) have a higher tendency to choose firm 1. In contrast,
simulation results in Figure 3 show that workers in firm 2 come disproportionately from the right tail of
the population distribution of ξ2. Therefore, workers with relatively high levels of productive inefficiency
in firm 2 (i.e. lower level of the type of ability relevant in firm 2) exhibit a relatively higher tendency to
choose firm 2. Figure 3 also reveals that workers with the highest levels of ξ2 are likely to choose firm 1;
nevertheless, the majority of the firm 2 workforce consists of workers with relatively high levels of ξ2.
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These results are consistent with those of the previous research which has applied Roy’s model and
examined its properties in labor markets with symmetric information (Willis, 1987; Sattinger, 1993; Borjas,
1987). When ξ1 and ξ2 have a strong positive correlation, as in the standard Roy’s model, self-selection
tends to lead to higher average productivity in firm 1, and lower average productivity in firm 2. Since
workers with low productive inefficiency in one firm also tend to have low productive inefficiency in the
other firm, positive selection into firm 1 is associated with negative selection into firm 2.
When the correlation coefficient between log ξ1 and log ξ2 in the population distribution is -0.4, self-
selection leads to positive selection into both firms as given in Figures 4 and 5. The post-selection marginal
distributions of worker types in both firms lie above the lower tail of the population distribution and below
the higher tail of the population distribution. These results indicate that in the case of a negative correlation
between ξ1 and ξ2, workers are likely to choose firms in which they have lower productive inefficiency.
Similar to the results for selection under symmetric information, when self-selection occurs in the presence
of moral hazard, negative correlation between ξ1 and ξ2 tends to lead to an outcome in which each firm
contains the best workers.
4 Estimation
I estimate the structural parameters of the model using maximum likelihood. The data used in the estimation
procedure consist of workers’ occupational choices, wages, and information on whether they were dismissed
in each period. Before specifying the likelihood function, I will discuss several empirical issues that are
addressed in mapping the theoretical model to the data.
First, I translate workers’ selection of firm types in the model to the selection of occupations in the
estimation by assuming that firm j employs only white collar workers and firm k employs only blue collar
workers. This characterization applies to a labor market in which the white collar and blue collar workers
employed in a firm produce separate goods and have no interaction in the production process. Furthermore,
the monitoring technology involved in monitoring white collar workers are different from the monitoring
technology for blue collar workers.
Second, the model predicts that workers with the same tenure in a given occupation earn the same
wage. In order to account for the variation in wages observed among workers with the same tenure in an
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occupation, I add measurement error to wages. The measurement error takes on the following form:
lnwijt = lnw
∗
jt + εt
lnwijt = lnwsj + εt (10)
where wijt is the reported wage, w∗ijt the primary sector wage predicted by the model, and wsj is the
secondary sector wage of a worker dismissed from primary sector firm j. εt is independently and identically
distributed over time according to a normal distribution with mean zero and standard deviation, σε.
Another issue that should be addressed in the estimation is the number of dismissals per worker. Ac-
cording to the model, a worker experiences only one dismissal due to malfeasance in his labor market career.
Yet, roughly 26 percent of the sample report having more than one dismissal. In cases of multiple dismissals
over one’s labor market career, I assume that the first dismissal experienced by the worker during the sample
period is due to shirking. Dismissals that occur after the first one are assumed to occur due to labor demand
shocks when the worker is in the secondary sector. Furthermore, workers are assumed to find a new job
immediately when they are dismissed in the secondary sector. Thus, they do not face any repercussions of
subsequent dismissals that occur after the first one.
Finally, I assume that worker types in the population are distributed according to a bivariate lognormal
distribution, characterized by the following parameters: µj , µk, αj , αk, and αjk. The existence of a unique
equilibrium wage sequence among the class of increasing wage sequences requires the distribution func-
tion of productive inefficiency indices to be concave. The lognormal distribution satisfies the concavity
condition.
The likelihood function requires the numerical computation of equilibrium wages based on the model’s
parameters, according to the algorithm included in the appendix. The equilibrium wage sequence, together
with the parameters of the model, can then be used to calculate the likelihood function.
Let θ be the set of the model’s parameters. Then, the likelihood contribution of sample member iworking
in sector j is given by
Li = Pr(Vj > Vk, {lnwijt}Tt=1, {dijt}Tt=1; θ) = Pr(Vj > Vk, {lnwijt}Tt=1|{dijt}Tt=1; θ)
· Pr({dijt}; θ) (11)
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where Vj is the value of working in occupation j, {wijt}Tt=1 is the worker’s reported wage sequence, and
{dijt}Tt=1 is his dismissal sequence, indicating whether the worker was dismissed or not in occupation j in
period t. The full specification of the likelihood function is given in the appendix.
4.1 Identification
The identification of the model’s parameters is obtained using data on workers’ occupational choices, wages
and the empirical hazard rates of dismissal in each occupation over the sample period. The parameters to
be estimated are the occupation-specific monitoring rates (πj , πk), output prices (ρj , ρk), the parameters of
the population heterogeneity distribution (µj , αj , µj , αk, αjk), and the secondary sector wages for work-
ers who are dismissed from each occupation (wsj , wsk). As described in the Model section, Hj(ξj) and
Hk(ξk) denote the marginal distribution of worker types in the population while Fj(ξj) and Fk(ξk) indicate
the marginal distributions in occupations j and k8. In the following discussion, I will first explain how
ρj , ρk, πj , πk, β and the parameters of Fj(ξj) can be identified from wage and dismissal rate data for the
two occupations.
Wages and dismissal rates observed in occupation j are used in identifying the output price and the
monitoring rate in occupation j as well as the parameters of Fj(ξj) in the following fashion. Equations 12
and 13 give the wage and hazard rate of dismissal in occupation j in period t.
wjt = ρjFjt(ξjt) (12)
hjt = πj
¡
1− Fjt
¡
ξjt
¢¢
(13)
Fj(ξjt) indicates the percentage of workers who choose to exert effort in the cohort in period t. Then,
according to Equation 12 , when everyone in the cohort chooses to work, the wage reaches its upper limit at
ρj . Although this threshold case helps with the identification of ρj as the limiting wage, we do not actually
observe it in the data, and therefore, we have to consider identifying the parameters of the model when
Fjt(ξjt) is between 0 and 1 for all t. It is clear that one cross-section of the wage and dismissal rate data for
occupation j would not be sufficient to identify ρj , πj , and Fjt(ξjt) since in that case there would be two
equations and three unknowns. In order to disentangle ρj and πj from Fjt(ξjt), observations from more
8Fj(ξj) and Fk(ξk) are previously noted as Fj,t=1(ξj) and Fk,t=1(ξk) above. I drop the subscript t = 1 in order to shorten
the notation.
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time periods are needed. Since Fjt(ξjt) is a function of Fj(ξjt=1), we can increase the number of equations
by considering more time periods without increasing the number of unknowns. The feature of the model
that is crucial in identification is that the time-path of wages and dismissal rates are determined solely by
Fjt(ξjt). Therefore, the panel nature of the data can be exploited to identify the time-variant component,
Fjt(ξjt), and the time-invariant factors, ρj and πj , can be identified given Fjt(ξjt) and Equations 12 and 13.
For example, consider having data on two time periods, t and t+1. In that case, the ratio of wjtwjt+1 identifies
Fjt(ξjt), and then ρj and πj can be backed out from Equations 12 and 13. The parametric assumption on
Fjt(ξjt) is critical in identifying these parameters. Thus, occupation-specific parameters, ρj , πj , νj , ωj , can
be identified given information on wages and hazard rates of dismissal only in occupation j.
The identification of the parameters of H
¡
ξj , ξk
¢
is obtained through the set of equilibrium conditions
in Equation 9 given the parameters of Fjt(ξjt) and Fkt(ξkt). Therefore, the identification of the parameters
of H
¡
ξj , ξk
¢
require data in both occupations. As in the case of F
¡
ξj , ξk
¢
, a parametric assumption on
H
¡
ξj , ξk
¢
is needed to identify its parameters.
In order to check the performance of the estimator, I generate data based on a fixed value of the parameter
vector, θ. The estimator was able to recover the parameters, providing evidence that the model’s parameters
are identified. In the estimation of the model, I fixed the discount rate at 0.95.
5 Data
5.1 The Sample
The sample used in the estimation is constructed from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY),
which is a survey of individuals who were between the ages of 14 and 22 when they were first interviewed
in 1979. Since then, the respondents have been interviewed annually until 1994 and once every two years
after 1994. 19 waves of the NLSY were available from 1979 to 2000 are used in the analysis.
One of the strengths of the NLSY compared to other longitudinal datasets is the detailed employment
information that it collects. It includes the beginning and end dates of up to five jobs that the respondent has
had in a year. Therefore, a relatively more accurate date of transition into the labor market can be established
and job tenure can be fully captured. In addition, it includes data on usual hours worked, number of weeks
worked, the hourly rate of pay, the three-digit industry and occupation codes, and the reason for separation
from the job.
18
The model makes certain predictions about wages and dismissal rates among workers who have worked
the same number of years in their first occupation. Therefore, the beginning of one’s labor market career
needs to be determined for the empirical analysis. Following Farber (1994), I assume that a worker’s labor
market career starts when he makes a permanent transition into the labor force. According to this definition,
a permanent labor market transition occurs in the beginning of the first 3-year spell of "primarily working,"
following at least one year in which the worker was "not primarily working"9. A worker is defined to be
primarily working if he has worked at least half of the weeks since the last interview and averaged at least
30 hours per week during the weeks in which he worked. The sample includes only workers who have
made a permanent transition into the labor force during the sample period. Consequently, people who have
never worked primarily for three consecutive years during the sample period and those who were primarily
working in the first year in which they were observed in the dataset are excluded from the sample. Restricting
the sample to those who have made a long-term transition into the labor market during the sample period not
only mitigates the initial condition problem, but also allows one to focus on the labor market experiences of
those workers who have formed a long-term attachment to the labor market. Furthermore, I exclude workers
who have started their labor market careers before the age of 16.
Only jobs that start after the worker’s permanent labor market transition are included in the sample. In
addition, jobs without valid data on wage, occupation and reason for separation are excluded. The occupa-
tion data are collected for jobs that last for at least 9 weeks; as a result, jobs with shorter tenure are excluded
from the sample.
The discrete period of analysis is an interview year, which spans the time between two consecutive
interviews and is approximately equal to one calendar year. The sample includes the first 8 years of a
worker’s labor market history beginning with his permanent transition into the labor force. Since the dataset
has information on up to 5 jobs per year and the job tenure is in weeks, I use the following rules to construct
the variables used in the analysis.
Occupation: I categorize occupations into blue collar or white collar, based on one-digit census codes10.
The worker’s occupation in a given year is the one in which he has worked the most number of hours.
For multiple job holders, the jobs that are not in the worker’s assigned occupation are excluded from the
9Farber (1994) and Farber and Gibbons (1991) show that the definition of permanent labor force entry is able to define a sharp
transition from non-work to work.
10White collar occupations are 1) professional, technical, and kindred; 2) managers, officials, and proprietors; 3) sales workers;
4) farmers and farm managers; and 5) clerical and kindred. Blue collar occupations are 1) craftsmen, foremen, and kindred; 2)
operatives and kindred; 3) laborers, except farm; 4) farm laborers and foremen; and 5) service workers.
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analysis. For example, if a multiple job holder has worked the most number of hours in the white collar
occupation in a given year, any blue collar job that he may have had during that year is excluded. Formulating
the two types of primary sectors as white collar and blue collar occupations in the estimation carries the
underlying assumption that workers use different types of skill sets in different occupations and that jobs
within each occupation are homogeneous with respect to their output prices and monitoring rates. Increasing
the number of occupational categories would probably capture skill heterogeneity and firm heterogeneity
more accurately; however, the computational burden would also increase.
Wages: I use hourly wages in 2000 dollars. For multiple job holders, I calculate the weighted average
of wages in the worker’s occupation by multiplying each wage by the number of hours worked in each job
and dividing the total earnings by the total number of hours worked in occupation.
Dismissals: If the worker has reported a firing or lay-off during an interview year, he is considered to
have experienced a dismissal at the end of that year. I consider layoffs as dismissals in this analysis because
there might be arbitrariness involved in a worker’s self-reporting. He may choose to report a firing as lay-off
due to the stigma that might be associated with a firing. Furthermore, the firm might choose to dismiss its
least productive workers during a lay-off instead of firing them since firing may increase the probability that
the worker will be disgruntled and possibly challenge the firm’s decision. Although it is quite difficult to
accurately measure dismissals, this is arguably the best definition given the available data. If the worker
reports a quit and takes on another job in the same occupation following the separation, I treat the tenure
in that occupation as uninterrupted. If the worker becomes unemployed during the sample period, I only
consider his experience until he enters unemployment.
Furthermore, about 20 percent of the individuals in the sample report switching to jobs in a different
occupation before their first dismissal. The theoretical model does not include inter-occupational moves
while in the primary sector; therefore, I make the following assumptions in mapping the data to the model.
If the occupation switch occurs while the worker is in the primary sector, i.e. before he experiences his first
dismissal, I include only his labor market experience until he switches occupations in the analysis sample.
5.2 Descriptive Statistics
After I impose the criteria described in the previous subsection, the resulting sample includes 5391 indi-
viduals. 2059 (38%) of these individuals are employed in the white collar occupation in the first year of
their labor market careers; and they remain in the white collar sector until their first dismissal or occupation
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switch. The remaining 3332 (62%) are employed in the blue collar sector.
Table 2 shows the observable sample heterogeneity in terms of age and education at the start of the labor
market career. These statistics suggest that blue collar workers start their long-term labor market careers
earlier than white collar workers. 45 percent of blue collar workers make a permanent transition into the
labor market between the ages of 16-18 while only 32 percent of white collar workers start their labor market
careers before they turn 19. A related statistic is the educational composition of the labor force in the two
occupations. Approximately 83 percent of the blue collar workers have at most a high school degree at the
beginning of their permanent labor market careers. On the other hand, white collar employees are relatively
more educated when they start their careers, with 41 percent having more than a high school degree.
Dismissal rates and average log wages in each occupation conditional on the sample period are given in
Table 311. Dismissal rates in both occupations follow a general downward trend over tenure in occupation,
except for the second period of employment among blue collar workers. This pattern is consistent with the
model’s prediction that dismissal rates fall in the primary sector because over time a smaller proportion of
the people remaining in the cohort choose to shirk. The blue collar sector has higher dismissal rates over
the first eight years in the occupation. The average white collar dismissal rate during this period is about 5
percent while the average blue collar dismissal rate is roughly 10 percent. Table 3 also shows that the wage
in each occupation is monotonically increasing over tenure. Blue collar wages are lower than white collar
wages at all tenure levels.
Table 4 presents ordinary least squares (OLS) regression results that show the effect of dismissals on
subsequent wages. These results support several basic implications of the theoretical model. First, the
statistically insignificant coefficient on the "dismissed in t-1" dummy variable suggests that dismissals in the
secondary sector do not significantly affect wages12. This result is consistent with the model’s assumption
that workers, who are dismissed in the secondary sector, immediately find another job with the same wage.
On the other hand, dismissals in the primary sector seem to have a negative effect on wages although the
effect is statistically insignificant among white collar workers (the sum of the coefficients on "dismissed in
t−1" and "(dismissed in t−1)*(never dismissed until t−1)"). This result supports the model’s implication
that workers dismissed in the primary sector find work in the secondary sector where they earn lower wages.
11The statistics presented in this table are different from those shown in Figure 1 because the samples used in generating Table 3
and Figure 1 are slightly different in terms of the workers who switch occupations. The sample used in computing the dismissal
rates in Table 3 does not include the observations after a worker switches occupations whereas the Figure 1 sample includes all
observations on a worker regardless of the occupation switch.
12Statistical significance is calculated at the 5% level.
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Finally, the regression results show that there is a significant difference between primary and secondary
sector wages of workers who were not dismissed in the previous period. In particular, the positive and
statistically significant coefficient on "never dismissed until t−1" suggests that primary sector workers earn
higher wages than secondary sector workers conditional on tenure. (A worker, who has never been dismissed
until period t− 1 and is not dismissed in t− 1, is in the primary sector in period t.)
6 Results
6.1 Parameter Estimates
Table 5 presents the maximum likelihood estimates of the model’s structural parameters and their associated
asymptotic standard errors. The estimates of the output prices are similar in the two occupations. The output
price is $14.44 in the white collar occupation and $14.77 in the blue collar occupation. The output price
can be interpreted as the upper limit on the wage sequence since it equals the wage that would be earned if
there were no shirking. The secondary sector wage is $11.47 for workers who have been dismissed from a
white collar job and $10.65 for those who have been dismissed from a blue collar job. This result suggests
that blue collar workers, who have been dismissed, earn less on their next jobs than the dismissed white
collar workers. Furthermore, monitoring rate in the white collar sector is estimated to be 32 percent while
the estimate for the blue collar sector is 25 percent. According to these findings, white collar workers face a
higher probability of being monitored than blue collar workers.
The marginal population distribution of log ξ1 has an estimated mean of 2.02 and a variance of 1.2, while
the estimates for the mean and variance of log ξ2 are 2.5 and 0.9, respectively13. Therefore, the population
distribution of blue collar productive inefficiency (ξ2) has a larger mass at high inefficiency levels and is
more concentrated around its mean when compared to the population distribution of white collar inefficiency
index (ξ1). Finally the covariance between log ξ1 and log ξ2 is estimated to be 0.89, which translates into
a correlation coefficient of 0.86 between the two random variables. This result supports the hypothesis that
the abilities relevant in blue collar and white collar occupations are highly correlated, indicating that the
skills needed in the two occupations might be similar to each other.
Figures 6 and 7 compare the population marginal distributions with the post-selection marginal dis-
tribution in each occupation. The parameters of the post-selection distributions of worker types in each
13In the discussion of results, I will refer to the white collar inefficiency index as ξ1 and the blue collar inefficiency index as ξ2.
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occupation are estimated by using maximum likelihood of fitting the post-selection distributions to lognor-
mal distributions. As shown in Figure 6, the distribution of worker types in the white collar occupation is
very close to the population distribution. The estimates of the mean and the variance of log ξ1 among white
collar workers are 1.96 and 1.2, resulting in a post-selection distribution of log ξ1 in the white collar occupa-
tion that is very close to the distribution of log ξ1 in the population. The distribution of log ξ1 in the white
collar sector has slightly higher mass in the lower tail and a slightly smaller mass in the upper tail, compared
to the population distribution. Therefore, workers with low values of ξ1 have a higher tendency to become
white collar workers while those with high values of ξ1 have a slightly lower probability of choosing the
white collar occupation. Since lower values of the inefficiency index (ξ1) indicate higher ability in the white
collar occupation, these results can be interpreted as evidence of a small degree of positive selection into
white collar occupation.
The pattern of selection into the blue collar occupation is more complicated as shown in Figure 7. The
estimates for the mean and variance of the distribution of log ξ2 among blue collar workers are 2.43 and
0.42, respectively. As shown in Figure 7, the marginal distribution of log ξ2 among blue collar workers
lies below the population distribution at low levels of log ξ2, indicating that workers with low productive
inefficiency in the blue collar sector tend to choose the white collar sector. The post-selection distribution
also has a smaller mass at high levels of log ξ2 than the population distribution. Therefore, workers with
high levels of productive inefficiency in the blue collar sector also have a higher probability of choosing the
white collar occupation. The tendency of both high inefficiency and low inefficiency workers to avoid the
blue collar sector would have opposite effects on the expected worker productivity in that sector. The forces
behind this mixed pattern of selection and its impact on equilibrium wages and dismissal rates in the two
occupations are discussed in the following subsections.
Table 6 lists the dismissal rates and the hourly wage sequences that result in an equilibrium characterized
by the parameter estimates given in Table 5. Dismissal rates in both occupations fall over tenure as dictated
by the model. blue collar workers face higher dismissal rates than white collar workers during the first eight
years in the occupation. The high rate of dismissals in the blue collar sector is driven by the result that
relative to the white collar sector, the blue collar workforce is composed of a higher proportion of workers
who are likely to shirk. In fact, the estimated average productivity in the blue collar sector over the sample
period is 0.69, indicating that almost 31 percent of blue collar workers are shirking on average during the
sample period. On the other hand, the average white collar productivity over 8 periods is 0.86. Although
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the dismissal rates are lower in the white collar occupation, they fall faster than blue collar dismissal rates,
especially in the first few years in the occupation. This result suggests shirkers are detected and dismissed
faster due to the higher monitoring rate in that sector. Since the monitoring rate is lower in the blue collar
occupation, it takes firms longer to eliminate shirkers in the blue collar occupation.
Table 6 also shows that the predicted wages in the white collar occupation are higher than those in the
blue collar occupation. The white collar occupation exhibits higher wages in spite of a lower output price in
comparison to the blue collar occupation primarily because of the high level of productivity in that sector.
By the 8th period, 97 percent of the white collar workforce chooses to exert effort, and consequently, their
wage approaches the upper limit of $14.44. Furthermore, the theoretical model implies that wage growth
occurs as inefficient workers are eliminated from the primary sector so that the remaining workers in the
cohort become more efficient on average. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that the blue collar sector,
which has higher dismissal rates, also has a higher wage growth. blue collar wages rise at a higher rate than
white collar wages primarily because there are higher productivity gains in the blue collar sector due to the
systematic dismissal of shirkers.
6.2 Model’s Fit to the Data
Figures 8-13 graphically depict how well the model fits the observed data on dismissal rates and hourly
wages. The data points labeled "actual" represent the dismissal rates and average wages that are reported in
Table 3. The points labeled "estimated" represent the model’s predictions for the dismissal rates and wages
as listed in Table 6. Figures 10 and 13 show the ratio of the estimated to the actual outcomes.
The results depicted in Figure 8 reveal that the model’s fit to the white collar dismissal rates is quite good.
The ratio of estimated to actual dismissal rates is very close to 1 in several periods, and in other periods,
the estimated white collar dismissal rate is slightly lower than the actual. The blue collar dismissal rates
estimated by the model are lower than the observed dismissal rates, except in the first year of employment.
However, the predicted blue collar dismissal rates exhibit a similar rate of decrease as the observed dismissal
rates. These results seem to suggest that dismissals for cause, as modeled in this paper, can explain most
of the dismissals observed in the white collar occupation. However, relative to the white collar occupation,
a greater proportion of dismissals in the blue collar occupation may be due to reasons not included in the
model, such as exogenous demand shocks.
The hourly wages predicted by the self-selection model and those observed in the data are plotted in
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Figures 11-13. In the white collar occupation, the model overestimates the wages in the earlier years and
underestimates them at later years in the occupation. In the blue collar occupation, the opposite pattern is
evident as the estimated to the actual wage ratio is higher than one in earlier periods and less than one in later
periods. While the model explains wage levels over one’s tenure in the occupation, it does not fully explain
the rate of wage growth. In particular, the estimated wage-tenure profiles are concave, which causes the gap
between the estimated and actual wages. The concavity of the wage-tenure profile is an implication of the
structural model, in which wage growth is generated by systematic dismissals of unproductive workers. As
the dismissal rate falls over time, the rate at which wage grows also decreases, leading to the concave shape
of the wage-tenure profile.
6.3 The Implications of Self-Selection on Wages and Dismissal Rates
I use the parameter estimates to evaluate the impact of self-selection on wages and dismissal rates in the two
occupations. In particular, I compare the wages and dismissal rates that are predicted by the self-selection
model with those that would result if workers were randomly assigned to each occupation. In the latter
case, the workforce in each sector would be a random draw from the population. Therefore, the equilibrium
wages and dismissal rates in this case are calculated by setting the marginal distribution parameters in each
occupation to the population parameters. Table 7 lists the equilibrium wages that would result in a random
assignment economy. Results indicate that the random assignment of workers leads to lower wages in both
white collar and blue collar occupations when compared to the case with self-selection. Higher wages in both
occupations under self-selection indicate that workers’ selection into occupations increases the expected
productivity in both occupations. These results provide further evidence for the finding indicated earlier that
there is positive selection into white collar occupation in the sense that the expected worker productivity in
the white collar occupation rises as a result of self-selection. The previous subsection also documents the
evidence of negative selection into the blue collar occupation at low levels of ξ2 and positive selection at
high levels of ξ2. The net effect of this type of sorting into blue collar occupation is higher wages in the blue
collar occupation compared to the case of random assignment.
Self-selection also affects the dismissal rates observed in the labor market. Findings in Table 8 suggest
that dismissal rates resulting in an economy with self-selection are lower than those that would result when
workers are randomly assigned to occupations. Lower dismissal rates as a result of self-selection provide
further support for the finding that workers’ selection into occupations leads to higher expected productivity
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in both occupations.
6.4 The Effects of Moral Hazard on the Pattern of Self-Selection
In order to investigate the effects of moral hazard on the selection pattern, I compare the outcome under
moral hazard to the outcome in a labor market in which effort is perfectly observed by the firm. As described
in the "model" section, utility flow to a worker in a given period is the wage less the disutility of effort, which
equals the productive inefficiency index of the worker. When there is no moral hazard and thus every worker
in a cohort exerts effort, wage equals it upper bound, which is the output price. Therefore, worker chooses
primary sector firm j if ρj−ξij > ρk−ξik, provided that ρj−ξij > 0 or ρk−ξik > 0. The worker chooses
the secondary sector if ρj − ξij < 0 and ρk − ξik < 0.
In order to observe the self-selection properties in a labor market without moral hazard, I simulate data
using the estimates for the population distribution parameters and output prices given in Table 514. Figure
14 shows the marginal distribution of worker types in the population and in the white collar occupation
when there is no moral hazard. The comparison of these two densities reveal that white collar workers are
drawn disproportionately from the lower tail and are less likely to come from the upper tail of the population
distribution. Comparison of Figure 14 to Figure 6, which shows the outcome under moral hazard, suggests
that the existence of moral hazard in the labor market significantly mitigates the degree of positive selection
into the white collar occupation.
Furthermore, blue collar workers are positively selected into the blue collar occupation when there is
no moral hazard in the labor market, as revealed in Figure 15. This result stands in contrast to the outcome
under moral hazard when workers at both ends of the population distribution are discouraged from entering
the blue collar occupation (Figure 7).
There might be several explanations for why the moral hazard in the labor market affects the selection
patterns in this fashion. First, let’s consider workers with high values of ξ2. Given the relatively high
positive correlation between ξ1 and ξ2, workers with high values of ξ2 tend to have high values of ξ1 and
thus are likely to shirk in both occupations. The results suggests that when the labor market moves from
the no-moral-hazard to the moral-hazard case, these workers become more likely to choose the white collar
14The simulation exercise involves generating a dataset of worker types, computing each worker’s occupation decision based on
the value of employment in each occupation, and then finding the parameters of the post-selection marginal distributions based on
the worker types in each occupation. The post-selection distribution parameters are found by fitting the post-selection distribution
of ξ0s to a lognormal distribution using maximum likelihood.
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occupation , increasing the mass at the right tail of the log ξ1 distribution in the white collar occupation and
decreasing the mass at the right tail of the log ξ2 distribution in the blue collar occupation. Workers who
would potentially shirk in either occupation seem to choose the white collar occupation because white collar
wages are substantially higher than the blue collar wages, and the white collar monitoring rate is not high
enough to discourage shirkers from choosing this occupation.
In addition, differences in the selection patterns in labor markets with and without moral hazard can also
be explained by the behavior of workers with high ξ1 and low ξ2. These workers are likely to shirk in the
white collar occupation and exert effort in the blue collar occupation. A marginal worker, who has high ξ1
and low ξ2 and is indifferent between the two occupations when there is no moral hazard, might choose the
white collar occupation when moral hazard exists if the monitoring rate in the white collar occupation is not
sufficiently high to discourage him from entering this occupation.
6.5 The Impact of an Increase in the Monitoring Rate
In this section, I present results of a comparative static exercise that aims to investigate the effects of an
increase in the blue collar sector’s monitoring rate on the equilibrium wages and dismissal rates in the labor
market. As shown in Table 9, a 50 percent increase in the monitoring rate of the blue collar occupation
leads to lower wages and higher dismissal rates in the white collar occupation and higher wages and lower
dismissal rates in the blue collar occupation. A higher monitoring rate has two effects on the blue collar
workforce. First, it makes this sector less attractive for some of the workers who have high productive
inefficiency and are likely to shirk in a blue collar job. Second, it provides a bigger incentive to the remaining
workforce not to shirk. As a result, average productivity in the blue collar sector goes up, leading to a similar
increase in the wages of blue collar workers. A higher monitoring rate in the blue collar occupation also
leads to lower dismissal rates in that occupation through its impact on the direction of selection in the labor
market. Since the higher monitoring rate discourages both relatively inefficient workers from choosing the
blue collar occupation and the remaining workforce from shirking, the blue collar workforce consists of
proportionately more efficient workers. As a result, the percentage of workers shirking in the blue collar
occupation decreases, bringing about a similar decrease in the blue collar dismissal rates. The results also
indicate that an increase in the monitoring rate has implications for the profile of dismissal rates over time.
Table 9 shows that under a higher monitoring rate, dismissal rate in period 1 is 27 percent less than the
original rate while the dismissal rate in period 10 is about 90% less than the original, indicating that blue
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collar dismissal rates fall much faster as a result of a higher monitoring rate. This finding is consistent with
the implications of the model. A higher monitoring rate causes unproductive workers in the blue collar
occupation to be dismissed faster and thus the blue collar dismissal rate to fall much more rapidly.
The effect of an increase in the monitoring rate of the blue collar occupation on the equilibrium out-
comes of the white collar occupation are also consistent with the explanation given above. Since the higher
monitoring rate discourages workers with high productive inefficiency in the blue collar occupation from
choosing the blue collar occupation, these workers have a higher probability of choosing the white collar
occupation compared to the original case. However, due to the relatively high positive correlation between
ξ1 and ξ2 in the population, workers who have high productive inefficiency in the blue collar occupation also
tend to have high productive inefficiency as white collar workers. As a result, the proportion of relatively
inefficient workers in the white collar occupation increases, and the average productivity in the white collar
occupation decreases. This adverse effect on the composition of the white collar workforce results in lower
wages and higher dismissal rates in this occupation as given in Table 9.
6.6 The Impact of an Increase in the Output Price
This section investigates the effects of a 10 percent increase in the output price in the white collar sector.
According to the findings presented in Table 10, a 10 percent increase in the white collar output price leads
to higher wages and lower dismissal rates in the white collar occupation. A higher output price in the white
collar sector brings about an increase in white collar wages through two channels. First, an increase in
output price has a direct positive effect on wages since it raises the value of workers’ marginal product.
Furthermore, higher wages due to a higher output price provide work incentives, decrease shirking and thus
increase expected productivity in that occupation. This increase in expected productivity further increases
the wages in the white collar occupation, resulting in an average of 11 percent increase in white collar wages
over 10 periods. Results in Table 10 also indicate that a higher white collar output price brings about lower
dismissal rates in that occupation. These findings support the explanation that an increase in the white collar
output price leads to a decrease in the proportion of shirking workers in the white collar occupation due to
its direct positive effect on wages.
The bottom part of Table 10 shows the effects of an increase in the white collar occupation’s output
price on the equilibrium outcomes in the blue collar occupation. According to these results, wages rise
and dismissal rates fall in the blue collar occupation when the output price in the white collar occupation
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increases. This result suggests that an increase in the white collar output price affects the selection pattern in
such a way that it brings about a blue collar workforce that is on average more productive and less likely to
shirk. Higher wages in the white collar occupation can attract both workers with low productive inefficiency
indices as well as those with high productive inefficiency indices in the blue collar occupation. The results
of this exercise suggest that when the white collar output price increases by 10 percent, it is the movement of
workers with high blue collar productive inefficiency indices out of the blue collar occupation and into the
white collar occupation that has a dominating effect on the blue collar wages and dismissal rates. As more
workers, who would potentially shirk in the blue collar sector, are attracted to the white collar occupation
due to the higher wages, the blue collar workforce consists of disproportionately more productive workers.
Consequently, as the propensity of shirking decreases in the blue collar occupation, wages rise along with
expected productivity, and dismissal rates fall in that occupation as shown in Table 10. Therefore, a higher
output price leads to a lower incidence of shirking and higher wages not only in the white collar sector but
also in the blue collar sector.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, I present the structural estimation of a model of occupational self-selection in a labor market
characterized by moral hazard. The model demonstrates that in such a labor market, workers’ occupa-
tional choices are determined by not only their comparative advantage but also their effort decisions in each
occupation. Conditional on not shirking, a worker chooses an occupation in which he has a comparative
advantage in terms of the amount of disutility that he receives from working in each occupation. On the
other hand, conditional on shirking, the worker takes into account the monitoring rate in the occupation
instead of his disutility of effort in making an occupational choice. Therefore, in this model, worker types
affect the selection pattern through their impact on worker’s relative ability in each occupation and through
their effect on the worker’s work/shirk decision.
The model is estimated using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. The estimation
results suggest that self-selection of workers increases expected worker productivity in both blue collar and
white collar occupations. In particular, workers’ selection into occupations leads to higher wages and lower
dismissal rates in both occupations compared to an economy in which workers are randomly assigned to each
occupation. Findings also indicate that the difference between the rates of dismissal for cause between the
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two occupations is driven by the higher expected productivity in the white collar sector. Higher wages and
higher monitoring rate in the white collar occupation provide stronger incentives to exert effort than those in
the blue collar occupation, causing the white collar workforce to have a smaller proportion of shirkers than
the blue collar workforce. The prevalence of shirking in the labor market ultimately determines the degree
to which the pattern of self-selection is affected by the occupational choices of potential shirkers.
Furthermore, analysis results reveal that the positive effects of self-selection in terms of higher expected
productivity, higher wages and lower dismissal rates diminish as the labor market becomes increasingly
characterized by moral hazard. If the occupational sorting took place in a labor market without a moral
hazard problem, workers in both occupations would predominantly come from the higher ability end of the
population distribution. This difference can be explained by the behavior of low ability workers who are also
potential shirkers when there is moral hazard in the labor market. When compared to the case without moral
hazard, workers in the moral hazard case have a higher probability of choosing an occupation in which they
have low ability since they now have the option of shirking and avoiding the disutility of effort.
Finally, results reveal that a higher monitoring rate in the blue collar occupation leads to higher wages
and lower dismissal rates in the blue collar occupation and lower wages and higher dismissal rates in the
white collar occupation. While an increase in the monitoring rate in the blue collar occupation decreases
the propensity to shirk in the blue collar occupation, it makes the white collar occupation relatively more
attractive to those workers, who have low ability and are potential shirkers in both occupations. On the other
hand, a higher white collar output price leads to higher wages and lower dismissal rates in both occupations.
These analyses demonstrate that an exogenous shock in one occupation can have positive or adverse effects
on the other occupation’s economic outcomes depending on its impact on the pattern of workers’ selection
into occupations.
The model presented in this paper can be extended in different directions. First, the model can be ex-
tended to incorporate other sources of wage growth, such as learning-by-doing or human capital investment,
in order to enhance the model’s ability to explain the rate of wage growth over tenure in occupation. This
extension is considered in Demiralp (2007). Second, the model presented here abstracts from firms’ de-
cisions on monitoring intensity by taking the monitoring rate as exogenous. The model can be extended
to explain the firms’ monitoring decision by specifying the monitoring technology and monitoring costs,
thus allowing one to study how the firm changes its monitoring rate in response to other variables, such as
worker productivity. Finally, the model presented here focuses only on dismissals that are due to shirking
30
or malfeasance. The model can also be formulated to include other causes of dismissals, such as exoge-
nous demand fluctuations and low worker-firm match value. This addition would allow one to study of the
relative importance of different causes of dismissals in the labor market.
8 Appendix
8.1 Computation of the EquilibriumWage Sequence
The computation of the equilibrium wage contract consists of two sets of fixed point iterations, one nested
within the other. Let (νj , ωj) be the set of parameters that characterize the post-selection marginal distribu-
tion of ξj in occupation j. Then, (νj , ωj) and (νk, ωk) are the fixed points of the following operator:
⎡
⎢⎣
(νj , ωj)
(νk, ωk)
⎤
⎥⎦ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∞Z
0
h1(ξ1)
H1(ξ∗(w1(θ1,θ2),w2(θ1,θ2)))
dH2(ξ2)
∞Z
0
h2(ξ2)
H1(ξ∗(w1(θ1,θ2),w2(θ1,θ2)))
dH1(ξ1)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(14)
Embedded in this fixed point algorithm is a second fixed point algorithm that computes the wage sequence
in each occupation, conditional on (νj , ωj) and (νk, ωk). The wage sequence in primary sector firm j,
conditional on (νj , ωj), is the fixed point of the following operator:
T ({wjt}) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρjFj,t=1(ξj,t=1)
ρjFj,t=2(ξj,t=2)
...
ρjFj,t=τ (ξj,t=τ )
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(15)
The finite approximation of this infinite horizon problem is given by the following mapping:
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TS({wjt}) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ρjFj,t=1(ξj,t=1)
...
ρjFj,t=S(ξj,t=S)
ρj
ρj
...
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(16)
The fixed points of TS({wjt}) gives the wage sequence in firm j conditional on the marginal distribution
of ξj in firm j. Every iteration in solving the fixed point problem in Equation 16 involves the computa-
tion of the conditional equilibrium wage sequence; therefore, the algorithm to compute the fixed points of
TS({wjt}) is nested within the algorithm to compute the parameters of fj(ξj).
The procedure to calculate the equilibrium wages and marginal distribution parameters in each firm are
explained below. The execution of the following procedure relies on parametric assumptions regarding both
the marginal distribution of worker types in the population and the marginal distribution of types in each
occupation. H(ξj , ξk), which describes worker heterogeneity in the population, is assumed to be a bivariate
lognormal distribution. Fj,t=1(ξj) is the marginal distribution of ξj in firm j in the beginning of period
1, and it is also assumed to be a lognormal distribution. The algorithm to compute the equilibrium wage
sequence in each firm is as follows:
Step 1: Choose positive constants κ and ψ, and set S to a large positive integer.
Step 2: Randomly draw N observations from the bivariate population distribution,H(ξj , ξk) .
Step 3: Choose initial values for the wage sequence and denote them {wjt}0 and {wkt}0 .
Step 4: Using the operator T ({wjt}), iterate until Equation 17 is satisfied.
d∞
³
{wjt}K+1 , {wjt}K
´
≤ κ (17)
The value of the wage sequence at the final iteration is {wjt}∗. Do the same for firm k and compute
{wkt}∗ .
Step 5: Using {wjt}∗ , {wkt}∗ and the parameters of the model, calculate Vi,j,t=1 and Vi,k,t=1 according
to Equation 4, and determine which of the N (ξj , ξk) pairs choose firm j and which ones choose firm k.
Recall that a worker chooses firm j if Vi,j,t=1 > Vi,k,t=1.
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Step 6: Compute νj , ωj , νk, and ωk by fitting the post-selection marginal distributions that are generated
in Step 5 to lognormal distributions using maximum likelihood.
Step 7: Denote parameters estimated in Step 6, (υj , ωj)0 and (υk, ωk)0 .
Step 8: Repeat steps 4-6. Denote the parameter estimates (υj , ωj)∗ . ComputeDj = d∞
¡
(υj , ωj)∗ , (υj , ωj)0
¢
for firm j and k. Iterate (repeat steps 4-6) by setting (υj , ωj)0 = (υj , ωj)∗ and (υk, ωk)0 = (υk, ωk)∗ until
Dj ≤ ψ and Dk ≤ ψ. If Dj ≤ ψ and Dk ≤ ψ, the approximate equilibrium wage sequence in firm j is
{wjt}∗ and the parameter estimates of the distribution of ξj in firm j is (υj , ωj)∗.
8.2 The Likelihood Function
Let θ be the set of the model’s parameters. Then, the likelihood contribution of sample member i working
in sector j is given by
Li = Pr(Vj > Vk, {lnwijt}Tt=1, {dijt}Tt=1; θ) (18)
or equivalently
Li = Pr(Vj > Vk, {lnwijt}Tt=1|{dijt}Tt=1; θ) · Pr({dijt}; θ) (19)
where Vj is the value of working in occupation j, {wijt}Tt=1 is the worker’s reported wage sequence, and
{dijt}Tt=1 is his dismissal sequence, indicating whether the worker was dismissed or not in occupation j in
period t. Conditional on {dijt}Tt=1, worker i’s productive inefficiency vector (ξj , ξk) and the measurement
error in wages (εt) are independent. Therefore worker i’s likelihood contribution can be stated as
Li = Pr(Vj > Vk|{dijt}Tt=1; θ) · Pr({lnwijt}Tt=1|{dijt}Tt=1; θ) · Pr({dijt}Tt=1; θ) (20)
The probability that a worker has chosen occupation j, conditional on having no dismissals over T periods
is given by
Pr(Vj > Vk|
TX
t=1
dijt = 0) = (1− πj)T
ZZ
I(ξ∗j (ξk) ≥ ξj > ξj,t=T |ξk) · dH(ξj , ξk)
+(1− πj)T−1
ZZ
I(ξ∗j (ξk) ≥ ξj |ξk)I(ξj,t=T < ξj ≤ ξj,t=T−1) · dH(ξj , ξk)
+ · · ·+
ZZ
I(ξ∗j (ξk) ≥ ξj |ξk) ∗ I(ξj < ξj,t=1)dH(ξj , ξk) (21)
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The probability that a worker has chosen occupation j, conditional on being dismissed in period T is ex-
pressed as
Pr(Vj > Vk|dij,t=T = 1) = (1− πj)T−1πj
ZZ
I(ξ∗j(ξk) ≥ ξj > ξj,t=T |ξk)dH(ξj , ξk) (22)
The bivariate integral in the above equation is numerically evaluated for each individual in the sample using
the trapezoid rule.
The probability of a worker’s reported wage sequence conditional on having no dismissals over T peri-
ods is
Pr({lnwijt}Tt=1|
TX
t=1
dijt = 0) = σ
−T
ε
TY
t=1
φ
µ
lnwijt − lnw∗ijt
σε
¶
(23)
where φ is the pdf of a standard normal variable. The probability of the wage sequence of a worker who has
been dismissed at the end of period T and has spent T s periods in the secondary sector is given by
Pr({lnwijt}|dij,t=T = 1) = σ−Tε
TY
t=1
φ
µ
lnwijt − lnw∗ijt
σε
¶
(24)
·
T sY
t=T+1
φ
µ
lnwijt − lnwsij
σε
¶
Finally, the probability of the dismissal sequence, {dijt}Tt=1 is
Pr(
TX
t=1
dijt = 0) = Fj(ξj,t=1) + (1− πj)
£
Fj(ξj,t=2)− Fj(ξj,t=1)
¤
+ · · · (25)
+(1− πj)T−1
£
Fj(ξj,t=T )− Fj(ξj,t=T ) + (1− πj)T
£
1− Fj(ξj,t=T )
¤¤
and
Pr(dijt = 1) = πj(1− πj)t−1
£
1− Fj(ξjt)
¤
t = 1, ....T − 1 (26)
As shown in the equations above, the post-selection marginal distributions of worker types in each
occupation, Fj(ξj) and Fk(ξk), are needed for the construction of the likelihood function. The parameters
of these distributions are evaluated numerically by means of simulations because the truncation point in
Equation 6, ξ∗(ξi,k), cannot be solved analytically. The parameters of Fj(ξj) and Fk(ξk) are computed
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according to the fixed point algorithm that is explained in the previous subsection of the appendix.
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Table 1: Parameters Used in Figures 2-5 
Parameter Description Value 
ρ1 Output price in firm 1 30 
π1 Monitoring rate in firm 1 0.15 
µ1 Mean of log(ξ1) 2 
α12 Variance of log(ξ1) 1.8 
ρ2 Output price in firm 2 25 
π2 Monitoring rate in firm 2 0.15 
µ2 Mean of log(ξ2) 1.2 
α22 Variance of log(ξ2) 0.8 
α12 Cov(ξ1,ξ2) 0.9 
 
Table 2: Age and Education Distribution of the Sample  
  White Collar Blue Collar Total 
Age at the start of labor market career   
16-18 652 (32%) 1488 (45%) 2140 (40%) 
19-21 795 (39%) 1168 (35%) 1963 (36%) 
21-25 384 (19%) 390 (12%) 774 (14%) 
26-30 146 (7%) 174 (4%) 320 (6%) 
31-42 82 (4%) 112 (3%) 194 (4%) 
Total 2059 3332 5391 
Education at the start of labor market career   
Less than high school 545 (26%) 1690 (51%) 2235 (41%) 
High school 658 (32%) 1071 (32%) 1729 (32%) 
Some college 619 (30%) 521 (16%) 1140 (21%) 
College 189 (9%) 45 (1%) 234 (4%) 
More than college 48 (2%) 5 (0.2%) 53 (1%) 
Column percentages are given in parentheses.   
 
Table 3: Dismissal Rates and Log Wages by Period    
  Dismissal Rates Hourly Wage 
Period 
White 
Collar Blue Collar Total 
White 
Collar  Blue Collar Total 
1 9.47% 13.30% 11.83% 9.16 7.97 8.43 
2 8.47% 14.59% 12.12% 9.04 8.17 8.52 
3 7.95% 12.55% 10.51% 10.19 8.80 9.41 
4 4.45% 11.14% 7.93% 11.03 8.99 9.97 
5 4.32% 8.33% 6.28% 13.28 9.27 11.32 
6 2.71% 8.10% 5.12% 13.21 10.13 11.83 
7 1.63% 6.21% 3.60% 15.64 10.77 13.54 
8 1.62% 3.97% 2.59% 15.50 13.03 14.47 
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Table 4: OLS Regressions of Wages    
Dependent variable: 
log(wage) 
Entire 
Sample White Collar Blue Collar  
Dismissed in t-1 0.016 0.013 0.041  
 (0.017) (0.030) (0.021)  
Never dismissed until t-1 0.059* 0.049* 0.038*  
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.010)  
(Dismissed in t-1) *                
(Never dismissed until t-1) -0.083* -0.063 -0.086*  
 (0.025) (0.039) (0.032)  
Tenure in occupation 0.065* 0.079* 0.057*  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Constant 1.889 1.935 1.863  
  (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)  
Huber-White standard errors are in parentheses. (*) indicates significance at 5% level. 
 
Table 5: Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Parameters 
Parameter Description ML Estimates Asymptotic Standard Errors 
ρ1 WC output price 14.444 0.153 
π1 WC monitoring rate 0.320 0.013 
ws1 WC sec sector wage 11.467 0.079 
µ1 mean of log(ξ1) 2.024 0.034 
α1 var of log(ξ1) 1.201 0.016 
ρ2 BC output price 14.774 0.245 
π2 BC monitoring rate 0.249 0.007 
ws2 BC sec sector wage 10.649 0.054 
µ2 mean of log(ξ2) 2.491 0.103 
α2 var of log(ξ2) 0.899 0.043 
σε std dev of ε 0.471 0.001 
α12 cov(ξ1,ξ2) 0.890 0.090 
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Table 6: Equilibrium Dismissal Rates and Hourly Wages    
  Dismissal Rates Hourly Wage 
Period 
White 
Collar Blue Collar Total 
White 
Collar  Blue Collar Total 
1 10.85% 13.68% 11.11% 9.55 6.67 9.27 
2 8.18% 11.62% 8.61% 10.75 7.89 10.49 
3 6.01% 9.67% 5.72% 11.74 9.04 11.48 
4 4.32% 7.91% 3.85% 12.50 10.09 12.27 
5 3.05% 6.36% 2.62% 13.07 11.01 12.87 
6 2.14% 5.04% 1.80% 13.48 11.79 13.32 
7 1.48% 3.95% 1.23% 13.78 12.43 13.65 
8 1.02% 3.07% 0.85% 13.98 12.96 13.88 
Simulations are performed using 10,000 draws.    
 
Table 7: Equilibrium Wages under Random Assignment  
  White Collar Blue Collar 
Period 
With Self-
Selection 
Random Assignment 
of Workers 
With Self-
Selection 
Random Assignment 
of Workers 
1 9.55 9.28 6.67 6.45 
2 10.75 10.52 7.89 7.62 
3 11.74 11.55 9.04 8.75 
4 12.50 12.36 10.09 9.80 
5 13.07 12.96 11.01 10.74 
6 13.48 13.41 11.79 11.55 
7 13.78 13.72 12.43 12.23 
8 13.98 13.95 12.96 12.79 
 
Table 8: Dismissal Rates under Random Assignment  
  White Collar Blue Collar 
Period 
With Self-
Selection 
Random Assignment 
of Workers 
With Self-
Selection 
Random Assignment 
of Workers 
1 10.85% 11.46% 13.68% 14.04% 
2 8.18% 8.69% 11.62% 12.06% 
3 6.01% 6.41% 9.67% 10.15% 
4 4.32% 4.63% 7.91% 8.38% 
5 3.05% 3.28% 6.36% 6.81% 
6 2.14% 2.30% 5.04% 5.44% 
7 1.48% 1.60% 3.95% 4.29% 
8 1.02% 1.10% 3.07% 3.35% 
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Table 9: Effect of a 50% Increase in Blue Collar Occupation's Monitoring Rate 
  
Percentage change 
in hourly wage 
Percentage change 
in dismissal rate 
Percentage change 
in hourly wage 
Percentage change 
in dismissal rate 
Period White Collar Blue Collar 
1 -5.99% 5.76% 61.17% -27.35% 
2 -4.53% 6.56% 52.04% -41.63% 
3 -3.34% 7.33% 42.83% -53.60% 
4 -2.41% 7.78% 34.39% -63.25% 
5 -1.71% 8.23% 27.12% -70.93% 
6 -1.20% 8.26% 21.12% -76.84% 
7 -0.83% 8.12% 16.30% -81.35% 
8 -0.57% 9.09% 12.50% -85.07% 
     
     
Table 10: Effect of a 10% Increase in White Collar Occupation's Output Price 
  
Percentage change 
in hourly wage 
Percentage change 
in dismissal rate 
Percentage change 
in hourly wage 
Percentage change 
in dismissal rate 
Period White Collar Blue Collar 
1 13.74% -11.61% 1.92% -4.06% 
2 12.78% -12.77% 1.48% -5.31% 
3 12.02% -13.73% 1.14% -6.40% 
4 11.44% -14.47% 0.88% -7.40% 
5 11.01% -14.94% 0.68% -8.52% 
6 10.70% -15.65% 0.52% -9.19% 
7 10.49% -16.25% 0.39% -9.79% 
8 10.33% -15.45% 0.30% -10.45% 
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Figure 2: Marginal Pdfs of ξ1 in Population and in Firm 1  
When the Correlation Coefficient is 0.83 
 
 
Figure 3: Marginal Pdfs of ξ2 in Population and in Firm 2  
When the Correlation Coefficient is 0.83 
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Figure 1: Involuntary Separation Rates by Occupation
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Years in Occupation
Dismissal Rate 
Blue Collar
White Collar
 43
Figure 4: Marginal Pdfs of ξ1 in Population and in Firm 1  
When the Correlation Coefficient is -0.4 
 
 
Figure 5: Marginal Pdfs of ξ2 in Population and in Firm 2  
When the Correlation Coefficient is -0.4 
 
 
Figure 6: Marginal Distributions of ξ1 in the Population and  
Among White Collar Workers 
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Figure 7: Marginal Distributions of ξ7 in the Population and  
Among Blue Collar Workers 
 
 
Figure 8: Dismissal Rates in White Collar Occupation
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Figure 9: Dismissal Rates in Blue Collar Occupation
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Figure 10: Ratio of Actual to Estimated Dismissal Rates
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Figure 11: Wages in White Collar Occupation
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Figure 12: Wages in Blue Collar Occupation
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Figure 13: Ratio of Actual to Estimated Hourly Wages
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Figure 14: Marginal Distributions of ξ1 in the Population and among  
White Collar Workers When There is No Moral Hazard 
 
 
Figure 15: Marginal Distributions of ξ2 in the Population and among  
Blue Collar Workers When There is No Moral Hazard 
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